The Game… Aneela Shahzad


Game Theory is widely applied in analysis in geopolitics though it is not the only viable approach. Yet, it has an intriguing call for trying to make sense of strategic interactions between ‘rational’ decision-makers, their plans, the outcomes, and the possible state of equilibrium.

The theory, like all theories, aims to simplify the understanding around an event, but like in the case of Hamas and Israel, there is difficulty in recognising each of the elements of the theory. If ‘rational’ means a player who makes consistent decisions in same set of options, aims to maximise utility, takes only calculated risks and sticks to an optimal equilibrium – perhaps Hamas and Israel are not those type of rational entities, and in the face of repeated games, both do not seek utility nor a compromised equilibrium.

Analysing the Oct 7 attack by Hamas, we fail to see consistency with past Hamas attacks i.e. killing around 1,140 people and taking 240 captives compared to previous attacks that had barely ever taken Israeli lives. Being completely unprecedented deems the event to be out of the bound of any observable natural law underpinning the rationality of the two actors. In previous events of such nature, for every Israeli life lost the people of Gaza would have repaid with hundreds and thousands, so if Hamas was thinking of maximising utility, it would surely bow down to a compromised status quo.

Looking at ‘what’ actually happened at the location of the present event, one finds contradicting reports. On the one side, the pro-Israeli media tends to picture an intelligence failure based on Israeli belief that Hamas is no serious threat, and its relying on the rational that Hamas would be a ‘rational’ player. On the other side, there is an alternative media that is emphasising Israel’s complete knowledge of Hamas’ preparation and even its plan to attack. Rather The New York Times had reported that Israeli intelligence has obtained Hamas attack plans more than a year ago and named it the ‘Jericho Wall’. This year, July, Haaretz revealed how, in ‘crazy hysteria’, the IDF ordered Hannibal Directive on Oct 7. The concealed directive allows the IDF to even kill soldiers in order to prevent Hamas taking them captive. Photographic evidence reveals extensive bombing in the Kfar-Aza area by the IDF, on Oct 7. Does that mean Israel, knowing way back of Hamas’ preparations and training for this event, had preplanned a counter offensive that would increase the number of Israeli casualties and allow Israel to turn a real-event into a false-flag aimed at the complete ethnic cleansing of Gaza?

If that was Israel’s big-game, then what was Hamas’ big-game? Surely, Hamas would not have ignited a possibly years-long Israeli intervention inside Gaza that has already taken around 40,000 lives, wounded around 90,000 and brought down its complete infrastructure, just for the sake of it. Or just for the sake of satisfying its unachievable lust of erasing Israel from the regional map.

This takes us from ‘what’ to ‘why’, and forces us to bring more players into the game – Iran and Iranian-backed militias present in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen; Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, which were being expected to go on the path of normalisation with Israel; and China, which had been behind the historic rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Why is it that the rapprochement happened in April, ambassadors were exchanged in September, and Hamas attacked in October? Why is it that right after the attack the Saudis refused to normalise with Israel and revert to the Two-State-Solution. Why has the Arab League readmitted Syria and removed its terrorist-label from Hezbollah?

And was all this not exactly Israel’s greatest horror all along, its apprehension that it will be the first and foremost victim of Arab unity. The reason why, by policy, Israel and its allies have ensured a divide within the Arab world and between Arab and Persia, playing upon the Shia-Sunni divide. This explains why there was war and upheavals from Afghanistan to Tunisia post-9/11, but nobody touched Iran. Because Iran was the leader of the Shia World, and it’s breaking down would dilute away the divide.

But post-Arab Spring, when signs started appearing that the Saudis are sitting at the negotiating table in Iraq and looking for repairs in the Middle East, the West opted out of the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018. Since the Nuclear Deal in 2015, Netanyahu has continually called for attacking Iran. In 2020, he said, Iran “openly seeks to develop nuclear weapons and annihilate the one and only Jewish state”. In 2022, President Joe Biden said he would “use force” as last resort to keep Iran from nuclear weapons. So, the game here was to weaken the Arab World in the Arab Spring scenario, and when that’s done, turn to Iran.

Now coming to ‘how’ Hamas was able to attempt Oct 7. How did Hamas get all the weapons and training amid Israeli restrictions and surveillance? How has Hamas neither been affected by Israel’s deterrence nor shown any sign of compellance? How does Israel’s complete razing of Gaza infrastructure and repeated displacements of the people not forced them to disown Hamas? And how and wherefrom does Hamas get the energy to remain standing and disallowing Israel to announce a victory? Is it only arsenal and ammo, or are there some other elements at play here, elements that emerge from human nature, elements that are utterly unpredictable and seemingly irrational?

Perhaps a reevaluation of what the game really is, is needed. Perhaps the game is not the genocidal eviction of the people of Gaza. Perhaps it is not about Israel and Palestine. Perhaps Hamas and Israel are playing a bigger game – a game that does not seek equilibrium, but a resetting of the rules of the game! And in that pursuit, Israel’s present game seems to be to spill the war all over the Muslim World, and create a WWIII-scenario, whereas Hamas’ game may be to constantly return the war towards the Gaza-Israel dip, wherein it deems to sinkhole Israel.

Courtesy The Express Tribune