Protecting Chinese investments…Khurram Husain
THERE are two critical dialogues taking place between the governments of China and Pakistan. One of them concerns the rescheduling of payables owed to Chinese project sponsors by the government of Pakistan. The second revolves around protection of Chinese investments and nationals in Pakistan in the wake of deadly attacks.
There is now a string of statements from Chinese officials, going back a few years in time, stressing how important it is for them that the state of security for their nationals living and working in Pakistan be improved. Recently, we had a joint statement released on Oct 15, after the visit to Islamabad by Chinese premier Li Qiang for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which spoke of the need to “jointly create a safe environment” for Chinese investments and personnel in Pakistan.
That statement came couched heavily in diplomatic language. The security concerns expressed by the joint statement were mild compared to other statements, such as a vexed retort by the Chinese ambassador to Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s off-the-cuff remark that Pakistan is unique to the Chinese in that they are willing to invest here despite the security risks their personnel face, or earlier statements following the March attack on Chinese workers on the Dasu hydropower project.
However, the matter is far more serious. On Monday, for example, two things happened around this question. One was a routine press conference by the Chinese foreign ministry in which the Reuters correspondent asked specifically about “recent attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan” and received another diplomatic answer with no specifics, using language like ‘China will continue to support Pakistan in fighting terrorism’.
But on the same day, almost at the same time, Pakistani officials in the city of Karachi hosted a press conference in which they provided minute details of the terror attack on Oct 6 outside Karachi airport that took the lives of two Chinese nationals and one Pakistani citizen.
The next day, Reuters put out a story saying “Beijing is pushing Pakistan to allow its own security staff to provide protection to thousands of Chinese citizens” working in Pakistan. The push by Beijing came after the October attack, which the story said has “angered China, which has pushed Pakistan to begin formal negotiations for a joint security management system”. The story was sourced to “five Pakistani security and government sources with direct knowledge of the previously unreported negotiations”.
The following day, another article in the Financial Times, written from Taipei and Islamabad, carried the same message. Beijing was unhappy with the security situation in Pakistan and was demanding a greater role for itself in securing its nationals from attacks. The demand to allow Chinese authorities to protect Chinese investments and nationals was originating from within the managements of the enterprises already operating in Pakistan, according to the FT article, which cited a number of Chinese executives in Pakistan.
To some extent, the request had been granted. In some cases, cited by the article, Chinese security engineers were already on the ground to set up the security plan, hire local guards, run background checks, and “gather intelligence”. But pressure is apparently mounting to grow this role.
A subtle change in approach seems to have come about in how the Chinese are dealing with Pakistan when stressing their security concerns for their investments and personnel here. In previous cases, official Chinese announcements made their displeasure with the security situation explicit, and generally downplayed other aspects of the relationship. But now that equation has been reversed.
The joint statement issued after the last SCO, for example, talks at great length about “consolidating” and “deepening” and “promoting practical cooperation”. It lists some areas where this cooperation will be deepened, such as the ML-1 railway upgradation and Karakoram Highway realignment, but points to issues to be worked out in the financing arrangements for these critical projects. And the language containing the security concerns is muted and couched in the language of overall cooperation. The same happened on Monday, when Beijing was asked specifically about the security concerns and responded by talking more about cooperation.
Privately, though, things are different, as most recently evidenced by the Reuters and FT articles, but also by numerous other off-the-record interactions that people have had with Pakistani and Chinese officials. Privately, the Chinese are raising the deteriorating security situation repeatedly, and are demanding a more intrusive role for themselves in safeguarding this security.
This presents a very slippery slope. Where would such a role end? Would Chinese guards be used? Will they be armed? Under what conditions will they be authorised to use lethal force? Will they have the power to conduct surveillance, “gather intelligence”, flag suspects, apprehend people, detain them, question them, and so on? More importantly, Chinese security guards means more Chinese personnel in the country, which means more targets for the militants. Who will guard the guards?
The Pakistani authorities have done the right thing to not grant the request for an expanded Chinese security presence in the country. But for their part, it seems the Chinese are finding out that Pakistani authorities have a performative approach to solving problems. They say things, do things, and look busy, all the while letting the problem in question fester while trying to keep it out of sight.
This is how economic problems have been allowed to fester, problems like inadequate government resources, liquidity constraints in the foreign exchange markets, low savings to finance investment with, and so on. But now the time has come to solve the security problem. And the performative approach is reaching its limits.
Courtesy Daily Dawn