An unforgettable tragedy….Nadeem Iqbal
Rescue 1122 was also tasked to bring a rescue crane, but it was not arranged even though it was recorded in the meeting minutes held by the station commander and the assistant commissioner Murree. When the 1122 staff was questioned about the failure to arrange the equipment, they claimed that the responsibility was assigned erroneously. However, when questioned, they could not explain why they did not get the minutes revised or amended. This was recorded in the inquiry report that looked into the 2021 Murree tragedy.
This is one of the numerous errors committed by half a dozen federal, provincial, and district government departments, which converted tourists fascination for snow fall into a catastrophe. The gory incident occurred on January 7, 2022, when 22 tourists, mostly young men, women, and children, got trapped in their vehicles, during a blizzard, within a radius of around three kilometers of the Kuldana roundabout in Murree on the road leading to Nathiagali. They lost their lives on January 8 reportedly due to carbon monoxide poisoning, while desperately awaiting official help for well over 12 hours.
The day after the tragedy, the Punjab government constituted a committee to inquire into and determine the causes and lapses that led to the deaths of stranded visitors. The inquiry was completed within 10 days. Later, many filed petitions in the Lahore High Court, which gave the verdict in the first week of November 2022.
The two documents (the inquiry report and the LHC verdict) have given a horrid account of bureaucratic slackness and the total failure to develop SOPS and to operationalize, or effectively communicate them internally or externally to the people. Many recommendations/orders in the two documents are also general, and do not set binding standards or indicators to evaluate future performances of oficials.
The honorable LHC verdict has lamented that even though the Murree wing of Rescue 1122 claimed that on the night of the tragedy around 25 victims of severe weather were attended, none of the victims receiving medical treatment was located on the troubled road. Instead, medical treatment was provided for minor ailments around the posh Mall Road.
It seems that there is a lack of accurate data that can help with effective planning. For example, it cannot be authenticated that the 22,000 per vehicle entry early in the week built up to 32,000 on the weekend when the tragedy happened. At the same time, the total parking capacity in Murree is around 4,000, which includes parking on the road. Similarly, statistics about the lodging capacity are also skewed. The Hotel Association numbers around 215 hotels that can accommodate 24,000 tourists. At the same time, there are numerous guest houses.
The fact-finding document has said that the district government response to the disaster was lopsided: The entire administration was singularly focused on restoring the flow of traffic out of Murree. The assistant commissioner and the assistant superintendent of police (ASP), who were expected to take a multi-pronged approach, were seen pushing cars; this should have been done through wardens. Their perception of the potential risk to life because of carbon monoxide poisoning or hypothermia was not lucid enough to shift the focus of their efforts once the traffic was stuck. The deputy commissioner Rawalpindi did mention that the CPO and he discussed the possible risk of CO poisoning or health risk to the sick and the elderly. Still, the actions do not demonstrate that they followed up on the risk assessment, probably because it was too late.
There has been a lot of paper activity, but nothing translated into action to save stranded families. The Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) had issued several severe weather warnings for Murree from January 6 to 9. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) also claimed to have dispatched a letter on January 5 containing instructions for traffic management. But the officers concerned contended that these warnings were not received.
The PMD warning was shared on the Punjab Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) Punjab Info Desk WhatsApp group, which included both the commissioner Rawalpindi and the DC Rawalpindi. However, a review of the group activity indicates these advisories were read too late, leaving no time for planning and preparation. The committee also noted the PDMAs dereliction of duty because they merely forwarded the PMDs advisory on the WhatsApp group, without analyzing the potential risk or communicating it through multiple mediums (email, phone, or fax).
In addition, the fact-finding report also tells that the NDMAs warning sent via a WhatsApp message to the PDMA control room was not even opened by the director PDMA till January 18. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that no alert-specific coordination meeting or contingency planning was carried out to deal with the implications of heavy snowfall.
The court has also exposed the claims of the Punjab Highway Department (PHD) that around 29 vehicles, including snow blowers, were located at key points and remained functional in clearing the roads. To the courts amazement, it was found that 15 out of the 20 deputed officials did not have the required expertise to operate the machinery.
The court notes that it further divulged from the record that the job of sprinkling salt to counter the slippery ice roads was outsourced to a private contractor against Rs7.5 Million, as service charges only with no supervisory check. Even the salt to be sprinkled on the road was provided by the PHD having enough workforce and logistic support to do the job.
The court has declared that the loss of lives does not give rise to any criminal aspect; thus, the registration of the criminal case is not warranted. Still, the Punjab government cannot be absolved from its responsibility and mishandling of regional affairs by various departments, which can be described as one of the causes behind the tragedy.
The critical lapses identified by the committee include the failure of risk assessment and inadequate transmission of warning to officials concerned through proper channels and to the suitable quarters by establishing a control room, the lack of leadership at all levels, and no follow-up to ensure the deployment of assets such as snow removal machinery and necessary verifications of prior actions.
The crux of the court orders and committees recommendations consist of having a master plan for the city, upgrading it to the district level and evidence-based planning. They also call for the strict implementation of building code regulations and land use control, deconstruction of illegal structures and the development and implementation of a regulatory framework for various tourist and allied services.
One year down the road, tourists have again started going towards hilly areas to enjoy snowfall. But not much has changed on the ground. The onus of keeping themselves safe is still on tourists.
Courtesy The News