Deconstructing May 9…Faisal Siddiqi
They who have put out the peoples eyes reproach them of their blindness. John Milton
THE political violence witnessed from May 9 to May 11, 2023, is a subject of much controversy. For the establishment, it was an attack on the state. For PDM and its aligned parties, it was proof that the PTI is not a democratic political party. For the PTI, it was a conspiracy to dismantle it.
Therefore, on the one hand, the ruling coalition government and the state institutions have either justified, or kept silent, about the grave violations of fundamental rights, defiance of superior courts orders, subversion of democratic constitutionalism and repression of a free media in their quest to dismantle the PTI, on the pretext of safeguarding the state.
On the other hand, despite its authoritarian politics and past collusion with the establishment, the PTI has, paradoxically, now become the torch-bearer of fundamental rights, anti-establishment democratic constitutionalism and press freedom.
Who is right in this battle between state survival and democratic constitutionalism?
Leviathan strikes back: Faced with the English Civil War in the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes, through his classical text Leviathan, responded with a simple theory of governance only a strong state can save us from anarchy and violence. In other words, before any democracy or constitutionalism or fundamental rights, there must be order based on obedience to state authority derived from its monopoly over violence.
How should the Pakistani state have reacted to the events which culminated in the political violence of May 9, which involved abuse against, and efforts to question, the legitimacy of the military and intelligence leadership, along with a campaign to create divisions within the armed forces, violence against the coercive arms of the state, ie, police and armed forces, and labelling of the prevailing political system and political parties opposed to the PTI as foreign agents?
Hobbes would have approved of the states reaction to the May 9 political violence because, if there is anything worse than a military coup against a constitutional order, it is a coup within the armed forces.
Regardless of our complete unacceptability of the military coups by Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf and the continuing political dominance of the establishment, the saving grace in this country is the unity of command of the armed forces. The alternative to this unity of command is nightmarishly scary; ie, present-day Sudan, Libya and Yemen and all the African military civil wars of the last and this century.
But all successful modern states have also shown that Hobbess philosophy of order has to be combined with John Mills theory of rights. In other words, coercion has to be balanced and legitimised by consent based on rights and welfare.
Coercion and consent: As the Marxist intellectual Antonio Gramsci has explained, no ruling elite, including authoritarian regimes, can rule only on the basis of fear based on coercion, and legitimacy based on patriotism.
For example, all three previous military dictatorships of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf lasted for years because their rule was also based on implied consent of the masses, which was derived from relative economic growth (based on foreign aid) and a semi-successful propaganda ideology ie, development for Ayub, Islam for Zia and enlightened moderation for Musharraf.
Pakistan is a huge country of over 240 million people, mostly young men and women, who have an insatiable urge to be prosperous, but in the current times, this unfulfilled urge is fuelled by sociopolitical narratives through social media, resulting in anger and rage.
Although there is nothing unusual about the Pakistani states authoritarian response to May 9 violence, its objective to dismantle a popular political party and subvert judicial decisions are completely disproportionate, wrong and counterproductive for the following reasons.
Firstly, the 2007 judicial-lawyers movement, the PTM movement, the present Baloch insurgency and the May 9 political violence have much in common they are middle class, urban, women have a role, and there is rage without pragmatic solutions. This anger and rage cannot be crushed through coercion and seduced through patriotism.
Secondly, political mobilisation in Punjab, and Lahore in particular, has always succeeded (eg, 1968-9, 1977 and 2007-2009), and repressive tactics tested in Sindh, Balochistan and KP will not necessarily work in Punjab.
Thirdly, legitimacy based on coercion and patriotism in a period of stagflation will not succeed. Propaganda and coercion dont gel well with empty stomachs.
Fourthly, nobody relies on television for their political views and information. Propaganda on TV achieves little legitimacy.
Fifthly, can this state open up another front against a popular political party, when already it is faced with two insurgencies, ie, TTP and Baloch insurgents, and a hostile geopolitical neighbourhood? In short, a strategy based on coercion and patriotism to control politics and judiciary will not work. The sword (coercive power) must tolerate and coexist with the people (politics) and the pen (judiciary).
Indonesian path: In order to avoid chaos and global humiliation, the only rational path open for this establishment-dominated state is the Indonesian path to democratic constitutionalism. Indonesia and Pakistan have remarkable similarities: Indonesia also achieved independence in the 1940s; it was a military dictatorship from 1967 to 1998; its military establishment had institutional economic interest and was deeply involved in Indonesias sociopolitical development; it is a geographically and ethnically diverse country, and the worlds most populous Muslim country; it has experienced tensions between Islam and modernity; and lastly, there are secessionist movements in Indonesia.
But due to the severe financial crisis of 1998, the Indonesian military gave up its political power. Since 1998, democracy has deepened, constitutionalism has been established, powerful constitutional courts have emerged, but most importantly, without any reprisal against the Indonesian military, without any accountability of military rule and without disturbing the core economic and policy interest of the Indonesian military. Thus, it is an incremental and inclusive democratic model.
Will the Pakistani state rethink its disproportionate response against the May 9 violence? Most probably not. This is sadly because an examination of Pakistani political history teaches us that long-term thinking (as opposed to short-term political tactics) is not the strongest inclination of our ruling elites.
Courtesy Dawn